

Burgeoning BRICS Consequences for Canada

John Kirton

Co-director, BRICS Research Group, University of Toronto

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Introduction

One of the most dramatic developments in global affairs during the past decade has been the rising relative capability and intensifying international institutionalization of the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Identified as a conceptual category of big emerging markets by Jim O’Neill in 2003, the first four countries began meeting at the leaders’ level in 2009, subsequently picked up the pace of their encounters and, in 2011, added South Africa, which will host the fifth BRICS summit in Durban on March 25–26, 2013. Canada and other countries in the established G7 have appropriately begun to ask what the consequences of the burgeoning BRICS are for them.

In the search for an answer, several competing schools of thought arise. The first, evident in the paucity of interest in the question, implies that the BRICS as a collection of individual rising powers or a collective international institution is essentially irrelevant for Canada’s interests and international behaviour, presumably because the group lacks the staying power or the cohesion to make a real impact on Canada or the world in which it lives.

A second school sees partial relevance, as most BRICS countries (China, India, Brazil and South Africa) but more beyond (Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Turkey and Vietnam) offer a new generation of attractive trade and investment markets that Canada should focus on through a coordinated, multi-departmental international strategy directed from the top (Burney, d’Aquino, Edwards and Hampson 2012). A variant highlights Asia as a region, with Japan a key connector of a rising India and China there (McMillan and Stalk 2012; Kinsman 2010).

A third school suggests that the consequences for Canada may largely be malevolent, as Canada and its closest like-minded partners are excluded from a club that is increasing in power and cohesion, interested in its own interests and seeking to reform the overarching architecture of global economic governance for its own ends.

A fourth school argues that Canada has missed the BRICS boat that sailed a decade ago and that chasing it now to catch up would be futile and wrong (Carmichael 2012; Sharma 2012). This is because in a world where the broad surge in resource prices is over, the broad structural flaws in BRICS economies have surfaced and international opportunities are arising elsewhere.

A fifth school sees the BRICS led by China and India as inevitably playing a growing role in the global economy and urges an underinvested Canada to act now to deepen trade and investment ties with its emerging economies, by exploiting comparative advantages and economies of scale (Conference Board of Canada 2012). Some in this school show Canadian firms lagging behind their developed country peers in the companies they have acquired in the BRICS since 2000 (PwC 2011).

A sixth school sees the consequences for Canada as more broadly benevolent, based on the strong core of compatibility among the BRICS, the G8 and the G20 and Canada's close relationships with most members of the BRICS club.

In fact, the BRICS members individually and collectively present a promising opportunity for a strategic Canada — one that develops a strategy to deal with the BRICS in a mutually beneficial way. The BRICS countries, even with the recent slowdown in several members, still do and will continue to surpass the established G7 powers in economic growth, global demand for others' goods, services and investment, and global supply of financial stability and finance. They have greater size, staying power and stability than smaller soaring states now flourishing outside. The BRICS countries' intensifying integration and institutionalization, and the solidarity that these slowly breed, help prevent the historic rivalries among themselves from disrupting the global security and economic order, and generate a consensus that often coincides with Canada's positions and creates a global economic order in which Canada can flourish. The BRICS is increasingly dominated by open, democratizing polities with which Canada has privileged historic relationships, geographically as a next-door neighbour with Russia, demographically with China and India, institutionally with India and South Africa through the Commonwealth, hemispherically with Brazil through the Summit of the Americas, and with all together through the G20.

Yet in order to reap these advantages, Canada has to bring these component country relationships together at the highest level, just as the five BRICS countries have done themselves in the summits that they mount. A strategy and coordinative centre to do so should be shaped and supported at the top by the prime minister, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO), and should extend to key departments and civil society beyond. It could begin by building on the current negotiations for freer trade and investment with India to add, in turn, similar, supportive negotiations and compatible agreements with South Africa, Brazil and Russia. A democratizing China could follow at a later stage.

To develop this argument, this paper first reviews the record of the BRICS members as individual powers and as a collective international institution, to demonstrate that the BRICS grouping is here to stay as a rising centre of cohesive power, influence and opportunity in the world. The paper then identifies the many consequential economic areas where the position of the BRICS collectively, or of its most consequential members, is compatible with that of Canada, and thus offers a basis on which enhanced trade and investment partnerships can be built. The paper then outlines the core

components of a Canadian strategy for building such a broader, deeper partnership with the BRICS in the coming years.

The Burgeoning BRICS

Rising Relative Capability and Resilience

The burgeoning BRICS is here to stay in its sheer size and rapidly rising relative capability. With a strong share of the world's population, whose per capita income is increasing at a steady pace, its members offer an attractive market opportunity for countries such as Canada with a full-strength export-oriented economy encompassing the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors alike. Despite members' recent slowdown, their growth rate still surpasses the G7 and the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). None has fallen into or even near recession, unlike much of Europe. China has already bounced backed to its vibrant growth of the past decade. And even if the recovery in the United States survives its forthcoming fiscal cliffs or revives the way it seemed to in the mid 1980s and mid 1990s, the gap in overall growth, wealth and per capita income between it and China and between the BRICS and the G7 is highly unlikely to close, to make China's BRICS in global economic terms increasingly like America's G7 of old.

Beyond rising relative capability lies resilience in the financial and economic systems within the BRICS members. During the recent global financial crisis none of their financial systems collapsed and none of their banks was bailed out. They are also similar to Canada in their political stability, as, beyond China, their democratic traditions generate leaders whose shelf life is more like Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper's than those in Italy or Japan. Few of the smaller emerging countries that are now soaring and attracting attention can offer the size, staying power and stability of the BRICS in these regards.

Intensifying International Institutional Integration

The five burgeoning building blocks of the BRICS have produced an increasingly integrated, institutional edifice, even as the G7/8 has stalled and reversed in several ways. At the summit level, BRICS membership has expanded with the addition of South Africa in 2011. Interaction has intensified as the annual scheduled summit has been joined by those held on the margins of G20 ones. At the ministerial level, where BRICS institution building began with the foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia, India and China at the United Nations in September 2006, finance ministers started meeting in November 2008, agriculture ministers in March 2010 and health ministers in July 2011. At the official level there has been a greater proliferation, covering national statistics, science and technology, and national security advisors.

At the annual summits, BRICS performance has been on the rise (see Appendix A). Their busy leaders have a perfect attendance record at the annual two-day event, with the exception of 2010 when Chinese president Hu Jintao had to leave after the first day to attend to a deadly natural disaster back home. The number of public deliberations

encoded in the leaders communiqués has generally risen and doubled from China's Sanya Summit in 2011 to India's Delhi Summit in 2012. This has been the case in regard to trade and investment, where attention rose sharply at Delhi to take 25.5% of the communiqué (see Appendix B). The number of decisional commitments has been robust. The limited evidence available on the delivery of these decisions suggests that members have complied with their summit commitments at a respectable 74% or solid B grade. Most strikingly, the summits have expanded their development of global governance enormously, giving guidance or support to institutions within and outside the group.

This record suggests that for outside countries such as Canada, it is worth looking at and engaging with the overall BRICS international institutional forest as well as cherry picking from some of the individual trees.

Canada's Compatibility with the Burgeoning BRICS

Consensus and Compatibility

The BRICS's intensifying institutionalization and slowly strengthening solidarity as a result help prevent the historic rivalries among the members from disrupting the global security and economic order, and generates a consensus that often coincides with Canada's positions in building a global economic order in which Canada can flourish.

Economically, the BRICS countries have consciously long stood first as a generator of global demand and as the global macroeconomic locomotive at a time when the crisis-scarred global economy desperately needed one to reverse the great recession it was in. With Europe still stuck in recession, before the traditional U.S. locomotive gets up to full speed, the BRICS members' macroeconomic contributions remain essential. So does their willingness to commit their vast financial reserves to the coordinated global cause, first in the large-scale macroeconomic stimulus at the G20's first summit in Washington in 2008, then in their contribution to the \$1.1 trillion package focused on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the 2009 G20 London Summit and, most recently, in their contribution to the IMF's new firewall of a half trillion dollars in reserve to rescue Europe if need be.

At the most recent BRICS summit in Delhi in March 2012, across its broad political, economic and social agenda, the emphasis was on solving global problems that the BRICS broadly shared with most others, rather than demanding that others give the BRICS more. In the economic domain, closely linked with security, the leaders wisely warned against energy price volatility that would come from precipitous military action against or from Iran. Such action would do the most harm to an oil-dependent, recession-ridden Europe next door and an economically struggling Japan and United States, and could snuff out the still fragile global recovery as a whole. In the social sphere, closely linked with the economy, BRICS leaders spoke of the challenges of growing income inequality. In the political realm, the common concern with terrorism, piracy from Somalia and elsewhere, and stabilizing Afghanistan outweighed the divisions, within and

outside the BRICS, about the proper approach to Syria, Iran or United Nations Security Council reform.

The BRICS-compatible contribution to responsible, reformed global governance shone through in the Delhi Summit's defining subject — the birth of a BRICS development bank. First came a call to raise more resources for the World Bank and then, second, came the decision to receive a report from BRICS finance ministers on creating a BRICS bank — at the next summit a full year later. As South African president Jacob Zuma repeated in his concluding remarks at Delhi, the thrust was for an inclusive, sustainable development bank that would promote infrastructure, trade and investment not only within the BRICS members but throughout Africa as a whole. There was also a gentle call for a merit-based process for selecting the head of the World Bank, rather than any harsh criticism of American determination to keep its lock on the spot this time around.

On the architecture of global economic governance, BRICS leaders have repeatedly expressed support of the G20, a club that Canada co-created at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors in 1999 and hosted at the leaders' level in June 2010 — a club that Canada has skillfully used to ensure its equal place at the top-tier table ensure its desired outcomes on economic issues across the board (Kirton 2013; Cooper and Thakur 2013). The 2012 Delhi Summit did as much for the G20 in this regard as it did for the BRICS itself. The Delhi Declaration supported the G20 four times, starting in the second paragraph. It supportively referenced BRICS member Russia — which would host the G20 in 2013 — once and non-BRICS member and current G20 host Mexico twice. It also acknowledged “the primary role of the G20 as a premier forum for international economic cooperation” (Kirton 2012).

In regard to trade and investment specifically, the Delhi leaders, in paragraphs 14–18 of their communiqué, made four promises supportive of Canadian positions, one opposed and four with a neutral or indirect impact. They welcomed Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), committed to safeguarding the multilateral trade system, called on others to resist protectionism and disguised restrictions on trade, and supported the conclusion of the Doha Round. They did state: “We do not support plurilateral initiatives that go against the fundamental principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism.” They further sought to strengthen the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to strengthen trade, trade ministers meetings and export credit among themselves. Nowhere did they criticize bilateral free trade deals between themselves and countries outside.

Canada's Common Bonds with the Component BRICS Countries

This compatibility in trade, economic and other matters is reinforced by the inherited and intensifying common bonds that Canada has with each of the components countries of the BRICS. These bonds are sufficiently strong and similar to provide a basis for Canada to create a strategy that coordinates its five country-specific ones into a stronger whole, as a basis on which enhanced trade and investment partnerships with the BRICS can be built.

With Russia, Canada's multidimensional bond begins with its physical status as a next-door neighbour, with a similar geography and climate that breed compatible positions on the Law of the Sea, global climate change control and Arctic transportation routes. It has in the post-Cold War years been reinforced demographically by the growing community of Canadians of Russian origin, institutionally by common membership in the G8, Arctic Council and now WTO, and politically by Russia's continuing commitment and character as a democratizing society and state. Proximity and physical similarity in particular breed present and potential trade and investment ties in energy and mining, and much else.

With India, Canada's bond is limited by the geographic distance that matters less in a globalizing age and by the geophysical differences that can breed absolute advantages as a basis for trade. The bond is based on intense demographic ties, as Canadians of Indian origin are a large and growing part of Canada's population. Indeed, with about a million Canadians of Indian origin, Canada has five times as many proportionately as the United States (Malone 2011). They are also based on a deep, durable polity and society devoted to open democracy, the rule of law, multicultural and religious diversity, and federal governance. Canada and India are co-pioneers in creating the modern, multiracial Commonwealth and have worked together closely as co-chairs of key G20 working groups since the start. Trade and investment opportunities abound in basic physical infrastructure, which a blacked-out India urgently needs and which Canadian firms are well positioned to provide, in pulse crops, where Canada is a superpower producer and India a superpower consumer, and in nuclear materials should a political accommodation be reached.

With South Africa, the bond is based on over a century-long experience as victorious co-combatants in globally consequential wars, as co-creators of the Commonwealth as a club of equal dominions, in demographic ties and as comrades in the anti-apartheid struggle since 1985. The latter led to Nelson Mandela being named a Canadian citizen in 2001, the first living person to be honoured in this way.

With Brazil, trade and investment ties date back over a century and a half, to the time when Brazilian Light and Traction (later BRASCAN) importantly built the infrastructure of an industrializing and urbanizing Brazil. They have been joined at the leaders' level in the hemispheric Summit of the Americas since 1994. More recently Harper's visit to Brazil in August 2011 raised cooperation to a new level, including through the creation of a Canada-Brazil CEO Forum.

With China, the bond is based first on democracy, as Canadians of Chinese origin now represent the third largest group by language spoken at home. The historical ties date back to Norman Bethune, Canada's wheat sales to a starving China during the Diefenbaker years in the early 1960s and Canada's diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China at the outset of the Trudeau years in 1970. Under the recent Harper government, trade, tourism, investment and other ties have blossomed, highlighted most recently by the acquisition of Canada's Nexen by a state-owned Chinese oil company. The advent of a new Chinese leadership in 2013 could promise a more socially and politically open China, with which Canada can more closely connect.

A Canadian Strategy for Bonding with the BRICS

Canada's common positions with the BRICS collectively and Canada's bonds with each of the countries within provide a firm foundation on which Canada can build a badly needed strategy for a broader, deeper partnership with the BRICS in the coming years. The core components of this strategy involve elements tailored for each individual member but above all address the BRICS as an institutional whole.

The Components

Such a strategy begins with the basic fact that at the outset of the Harper government in 2006, all five of the present BRICS members ranked within the top 26 countries that the basic forces of world politics suggest Canada should concentrate on and develop partnerships with (see Appendix C). Indeed, the original four BRICS members ranked within the top 13, led by China in fourth place, followed by Brazil in ninth, India in 11th and Russia in 13th. South Africa ranked 26th. Yet on the central, most flexible component of international behaviour, especially for creating and delivering an overall strategy that begins at the very top of the Canadian state, Harper's summit diplomacy during his first four years in office lagged behind most of the BRICS leaders (see Appendix D). Thus fourth-ranked China stood sixth as a summit partner. Russia ranked 13th stood 8th due to its co-membership with Canada in the G8. Ninth-ranked Brazil stood 14th. Eleventh ranked India stood 15th, despite the Commonwealth connection. Only 26th-ranked South Africa standing 20th in summitry stood well above its geo-historical weight, in part due to the G8's ongoing inclusion of it through to 2009.

This suggests that Brazil and India were the BRICS countries that Canada was most underinvested in. In the case of India, a major move was subsequently made with the launch of negotiations for the Canada-India Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (or bilateral free trade agreement [FTA] in large part). It should be completed as rapidly as possible, especially as the conclusion of Canada's important agreement with the slowly growing European Union — a fellow member of the G8 — draws near in 2013.

To deepen this partnership with India, several Canadian initiatives could be taken. As Canada and India are co-chairs of the G20 working group on strong, sustainable and balanced growth, and as India's finance minister is committed to controlling India's substantial fiscal deficit, the two countries could mount a joint effort to broaden the G20's Toronto terms on deficit and debt control made for the advanced economies (excluding Japan) at the summit in June 2010 to embrace more members. Canada could similarly shift the focus in the working group from the traditional U.S.-led preoccupation with the imbalances created by China's currency regime to the investment desired by India and BRICS countries and others beyond. Other potential initiatives worth considering are Canada shifting to support India's (and others) bid for an enhanced status on the UN Security Council, associating democratic major power India more closely with the democratic G8 club and India's relationship with the Trans-Pacific Partnership on trade (Kirton 2005).

A combined inter-country strategy could begin by building on the base of current negotiations for freer trade and investment with India to add, in turn, similar, supportive negotiations and compatible agreements with South Africa, Brazil and Russia, which is now a member for the WTO and perhaps soon the OECD as well. A democratizing China could follow at a later stage.

The Collective BRICS Institutions

More importantly, Canada must combine these component country relationships and strategies at the highest level, just as the five BRICS countries have themselves done in the summits that they mount. Such an integrated BRICS strategy, focused on their increasing interaction and institutionalization, should be initially shaped and regularly supported and adjusted at the top by the prime minister, PMO and PCO. At the departmental level below, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, still institutionally siloed into the geographic and functional bureaus appropriate for the pre-globalization age, similarly needs a single policy and coordinative centre for the BRICS, which cover most major global regions and subjects on the interconnected international agenda today. Other consequential departments, starting with Finance, need similar centres and strategies as well.

At the civil society level, Canada's business associations with each individual BRICS country could usefully come together to mount a combined exercise to consider and coordinate their interests and involvement with the BRICS as a whole.

Such a strategy in its substance would start by considering how the intensifying interactions among BRICS countries, especially in trade, investment and finance, affect and could be mobilized to support Canada's relationships with each one. Here a focus on supply chains among the BRICS countries could guide how a cumulative Canada-BRICS country bilateral FTAs could evolve.

In its focus on the BRICS institutions, the immediate need is for Canada to determine the most desirable shape for the BRICS-bred south-south development bank. It should intervene on this basis with key members, notably India as the initiator and South Africa as host of the summit where the project should decisively take shape.

In terms of international process, connecting Canada to the BRICS summit-centric system on a more regular basis could begin with the prime minister holding a dedicated bilateral summit visit with the annual BRICS host in the months leading up to the summit, to learn about and advise on what the BRICS summit might do and how Canada and Canadians (and perhaps their G7 partners) might more closely connect with it. Harper had an opportunity to launch such a strategy in the autumn of 2012 when he visited Africa for the Francophonie Summit and added bilateral trips to two other African countries, but left South Africa out.

In the realm of inter-international-institution building, Canada could consider how to reintegrate the BRICS individually or together with the G8 summit and system, as they were prior to Canada's Muskoka Summit in 2010. With the 2013 G8 summit taking trade

as one of its priority theme and including trade with and among Africa within this theme, the relationship with the agenda of South Africa's BRICS summit in Durban is clear. Transparency and anti-corruption could be another common cause. One modest move would be for each summit to invite the host of the other as a guest each year. In general, the G8's decade-long experience with outreach could be shared with the BRICS to encourage it to do so on a broader basis than South Africa seems set to, with Canada on the potential guest list.

At the civil society level, it would be useful for Canadian groups to participate more in the many civil society components, including business, academics and think tanks that the BRICS summit contains.

Beyond these components, several large issues need to be considered and concluded before a firm Canadian BRICS strategy can be set. Should Canada focus within the BRICS on the pre-existing democratic core of the IBSA of India, Brazil and South Africa? How can the G20 be used more fully as a nest to connect Canada with the BRICS, beyond the current official level co-chair arrangements that Canada has? And in crafting its BRICS strategy, should Canada consider its G7 colleagues as competitors or as colleagues in a coalition in a common cause?

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Appendix A: BRICS Performance Chart

John Kirton, BRICS Research Group, January 31, 2013

Year	Overall	Domestic Political Management ^a	Deliberation ^b	Directions ^c	Decisions ^d	Delivery ^e	Development of Global Governance ^f	
							Inside	Outside
2009			1,844		16		2	13
2010			2,436		46		16	34
2011			2,253		61	+0.48	12	28
2012			4,415		37		32	42
2013								

Notes:

- a. Domestic Political Management is communiqué compliments.
- b. Deliberation is number of words, identified by Madeline Koch, January 31, 2013.
- c. Decisions identified by Jenilee Guebert and Caroline Bracht.
- d. Delivery data drawn from the compliance report produced by the BRICS Research Group for 2011–12.
- e. Development of Global Governance data compiled by Julia Kulik, December 20, 2012.

Appendix B: BRICS Leaders' Conclusions on Trade and Investment, 2009–12

Julia Kulik, BRICS Research Group, February 5, 2013

Year	# of Words ^a	% of Total Words ^b	# of Paragraphs ^c	% of Total Paragraphs ^d	# of Documents ^e	% of Total Documents ^f	# of Dedicated Documents ^g
2009	350	19.0%	4	10.3%	2	100%	0
2010	166	6.8%	2	3.3%	1	100%	0
2011	259	11.5%	3	9.7%	1	100%	0
2012	1,128	25.5%	13	18.9	2	100%	0
Average	475.7	15.7%	5.5	10.6%	1.5	100%	0

Notes:

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the BRICS leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

- a. # of Words refers to the number of words in paragraphs that refer to trade-related subjects for the year specified, excluding document titles and references.
- b. % of Total Words includes all documents for the year specified.
- c. # of Paragraphs is the number of paragraphs containing references to trade for the year specified. Each bullet point is recorded as a separate paragraph.
- d. % of Total Paragraphs includes all documents for the year specified.
- e. # of Documents includes all documents that contain trade subjects and excludes dedicated documents.
- f. % of Total Documents includes all documents for the year specified.
- g. # of Dedicated Documents includes all documents that contain a trade-related subject in the title for the year specified.

Search Terms

The following keywords were used for this report.

Inclusions

Anti-dumping, customs, commerce, Doha Development Round, duty-free, exports, global trading system, goods, imports, intellectual property rights, international trade, market access, most-favoured-nation principle, multilateral negotiations, non-discriminatory treatment, open trade, principle of national treatment, product standards, protectionism, quotas, regional agreements, services, subsidies, trade, trade finance, World Trade Organization (WTO), Capital account liberalization, carbon trade, direct income transfer (e.g., official development assistance — ODA), financial protectionism, foreign direct investment (FDI), investment protectionism.

Coding Rules

The unit of analysis is the paragraph/sentence.

A direct reference to development or a cognate term is required.

Cognate or extended terms can be used without a direct reference to development if they have previously been directly associated together in summit communiqué history.

Appendix C: Geopolitical Gravity Model Applied, 2006

Country	Capability (GDP in USD million)	Distance (km)	Democracy	War ^a	Total
01 United States	12,455.1	732	2	7	5.955
02 Japan	4,505.9	10,345	3	1	0.145
03 Germany	2,781.9	6,141	2	1	0.227
04 China	2,228.9	10,476	13	1	0.016
05 United Kingdom	2,192.6	5,376	2	9	1.835
06 France	2,110.2	5,663	2	8	1.491
07 Italy	1,723.0	6,756	2	6	0.383
08 Spain	1,123.7	5,702	2	3	0.296
09 Brazil	794.1	7,342	4	1	0.035
10 Korea	787.6	10,534	3	1	0.025
11 India	785.5	11,331	5	2	0.028
12 Mexico	785.5	3,599	4	1	0.055
13 Russia	763.7	7,179	11	1	0.010
14 Australia	700.7	16,108	2	6	0.131
15 Netherlands	594.8	5,645	2	5	0.263
16 Switzerland	365.9	6,099	2	1	0.030
17 Belgium	364.7	5,689	2	5	0.160
18 Turkey	363.3	8,174	6	5	0.037
19 Sweden	354.1	6,004	2	2	0.059
20 Saudi Arabia	309.8	10,327	13	2	0.005
21 Austria	304.5	6,583	2	-1	-0.023
22 Poland	299.2	6,576	2	3	0.068
23 Indonesia	287.2	15,646	5	0	0.004
24 Norway	283.9	5,610	2	3	0.076
25 Denmark	254.4	5,914	2	1	0.021
26 South Africa	240.2	13,044	3	3	0.018
27 Greece	213.7	7,760	3	3	0.028
28 Ireland	196.4	4,910	2	3	0.060
29 Iran	196.3	9,571	12	1	0.002
30 Finland	193.2	6,286	2	1	0.015
31 Argentina	183.3	9,000	4	1	0.005
32 Hong Kong	183.3	12,488	7	7	0.015
33 Thailand	176.6	13,431	4	2	0.007
34 Portugal	173.1	5,403	2	2	0.033
35 Venezuela	138.9	3,959	8	0	0.004
36 Malaysia	130.1	14,620	8	0	0.001
37 Israel	123.4	8,990	3	0	0.005
38 Czech Rep	122.3	6,350	2	2	0.019
39 Columbia	122.3	4,522	6	1	0.005

Notes: Number of times a country allied with Canada minus number of times that country was an enemy of Canada. Scored as zero if country was neutral or joined Canada more than halfway through the war. An overall score of zero is counted as 1 in the total.

Sources: Gross domestic product (GDP): World Bank Statistics database
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>; World Bank national accounts data http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/ddpreports/viewSourceNotes?DIMENSION_NAME=WDI_Series&HIERAR

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Appendix D: Summit Participation of Stephen Harper, 2006–09

Jenilee Guebert, G8 Research Group, November 23, 2009

Partner	Total	Given	Received	Occasion ^a
01 United States	25	22	3	SPP (4), G8 (4), G20 (3), APEC (4), NATO (4), B (4), SPP-B (1), UNSS (1)
02 Mexico	18	16	2	SPP (4), G8 (4), G20 (3), B (1), APEC (4), APEC-B (1)
03 France	18	15	3	G8 (4), G20 (3), B (4), FS (2), NATO (4), EU (1)
04 Japan	16	15	1	G8 (4), G20 (3), APEC (4), APEC-B (1), B (3), UNSS (1)
05 Britain	15	15	–	G8 (4), G20 (3), B (3), NATO (4), UNSS (1)
06 China	14	14	–	G8 (3), G20 (3), APEC (4), APEC-B (1), G8-B (2), UNSS (1)
07 Germany	14	14	–	G8 (4), G20 (3), NATO (4), EU (1), B (1), UNSS (1)
08 Russia	13	13	–	G8 (4), G20 (3), APEC (4), G8-B (2)
09 Italy	13	12	1	G8 (4), G20 (3), NATO (4), B (1), UNSS (1)
10 Australia	13	12	1	APEC (4), APEC-B (1), G20 (3), B (2), G8 (2), UNSS (1)
11 European Union	12	11	1	G8 (4), G20 (3), G8-B (1), EU (3), UNSS (1)
12 Korea	10	10	–	APEC (4), APEC-B (1), G20 (3), G8 (2)
13 Indonesia	9	9	–	APEC (4), G8 (2), G20 (3)
14 Brazil	9	9	–	G8 (4), G20 (3), G8-B (2)
15 India	9	9	–	G8 (4), G20 (3), G8-B (1), B (1)
16 Czech Republic	9	7	2	FS (2), G20 (1), NATO (4), B (1), EU (1)
17 Turkey	9	9	–	NATO (4), G20 (3), G8 (1), UNSS (1)
18 United Nations Secretary General	9	9	–	G8 (3), UNGA (1), G20 (3), UNSS (2)
19 Spain	8	8	–	NATO (4), G20 (3), G8 (1)
20 South Africa	8	8	–	G8 (4), G20 (3), G8-B (1)

Notes:

a The –B suffix indicates a bilateral meeting.

APEC = Asia-Pacific Co-operation forum; EU = European Union Summit; FS = Francophonie Summit; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SPP = Security and Prosperity Partnership; UNGA = United Nations General Assembly; UNSS = United Nations Special Session.